Improving Safety in Medical Devices from Concept to Retirements by McHugh, Martin et al.
Technological University Dublin 
ARROW@TU Dublin 
Books/Book Chapters School of Computing 
2013-12-01 
Improving Safety in Medical Devices from Concept to Retirements 
Martin McHugh 
Technological University Dublin, martin.mchugh@tudublin.ie 
Fergal McCaffery 
Dundalk Institute of Technology, fergal.mccaffery@dkit.ie 
Silvana MacMahon 
Dundalk Institute of Technology, silvana.macmahon@dkit.ie 
Anita FInnega 
Dundalk Institute of Technology, anita.finnegan@dkit.ie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/scschcombk 
 Part of the Computational Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mc Hugh, M., McCaffery, F., MacMahon, S., Finnegan, A.: Improving Safety in Medical Devices from 
Concept to Retirements In Book Chapter in Handbook of Medical and Healthcare Technologies, 2013, p. 
453-480. 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open 
access by the School of Computing at ARROW@TU 
Dublin. It has been accepted for inclusion in Books/Book 
Chapters by an authorized administrator of ARROW@TU 
Dublin. For more information, please contact 
yvonne.desmond@tudublin.ie, arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, 
brian.widdis@tudublin.ie. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License 
Dublin Institute of Technology
ARROW@DIT
Books/Book Chapters School of Computing
2013-12-01
Improving Safety in Medical Devices from
Concept to Retirements
Martin Mc Hugh
Fergal McCaffery
Silvana Mac Mahon
Anita FInnega
Follow this and additional works at: http://arrow.dit.ie/scschcombk
Part of the Computational Engineering Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School
of Computing at ARROW@DIT. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Books/Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of ARROW@DIT.
For more information, please contact yvonne.desmond@dit.ie,
arrow.admin@dit.ie.
Chapter X 
IMPROVING SAFETY IN MEDICAL DEVICES FROM 
CONCEPT TO RETIREMENT 
Martin McHugh, Fergal McCaffery, Silvana Togneri MacMahon and 
Anita Finnegan  
Department of Computing and Mathematics 
Dundalk Institute of Technology, Co. Louth, Ireland 
 
1. Introduction 
As with many domains the use of software within the healthcare industry is on the rise 
[1, 2] within the last 20 years.  The use of this software ranges from performing ad-
ministrative tasks such as patient registration to life sustaining tasks such as within a 
pacemaker. Prior to this, medical devices primarily consisted of hardware with a soft-
ware component. A significant shift has occurred with medical device manufacturers 
realizing that functionality can be added to a medical device through the use of soft-
ware. As the functionality of the medical device grows, so does the complexity and 
therefore the risk. The risk associated with this complexity applies to both the use of 
software in standalone devices and also medical devices designed for incorporation in-
to a medical IT network.   The incorporation of a medical device into an IT network 
can introduce risk to the safety, effectiveness and security (data & system) of the de-
vice. With an increase in complexity there is an increased risk of harm to the patient, 
clinician or third party. 
The most famous failure of software resulting in harm to a patient within a medical 
device was with Therac-25 [3]. Therac-25 was a radiation therapy machine which used 
software to control when a beam spreader plate moved into position to reduce a pa-
tient‘s exposure to radiation.  As a result of a failure within the software, this spreader 
plate did not always move into position when necessary and as a result of this failure, 
four people died and two were left permanently disfigured. In light of this failure and 
other significant failures of medical devices as a result of software malfunctions, regu-
latory bodies introduced regulations to ensure safe and reliable performance of medi-
cal devices consisting of software [4]. 
Within the United States, (US) medical devices are regulated by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). Within the European Union, they are regulated through the 
awarding of the CE mark, which can be awarded by notified bodies within each of the 
EU member states. Within Canada, medical devices are regulated by Health Canada. 
Whilst regulations vary between regions, the standards followed for the development 
of medical device software are typically universal. These standards include EN ISO 
13485:2003 – Medical Devices – Quality Management Systems [5], EN ISO 
14971:2012: Medical Devices – Application of Risk Management to medical devices 
[6] and IEC 62304:2006 – Medical Devices – Software Lifecycle Processes [7]. The 
primary concern of regulatory bodies is that medical devices are safe and reliable. To 
achieve this, all medical devices, regardless of safety classification marketed for use in 
the EU, US or Canada, must be developed in accordance with a Quality Management 
System (QMS). Within the EU and Canada, regulatory bodies recommend that medi-
cal device manufacturers develop their devices in accordance with EN ISO 13485. 
Prior to July 2012, medical devices manufacturers wishing to market a device for use 
within the US were required to adhere to the FDA Quality System Regulations (QSR) 
known as FDA 21 CFR Part 820 [8]. However, from July 1
st
 2012, the FDA began a 
pilot program in which they offer device manufacturers the option of submitting their 
quality system audits which are compliant with EN ISO 13485 [9]. This is seen as a 
step towards a harmonization between FDA regulations and Health Canada; however, 
it has the knock-on effect of being more beneficial to manufacturers who adhere to EU 
regulations.  
Whilst medical device manufacturers are compliance centric, there is also a shift to-
wards following industry best practices in order to further enhance development prac-
tices. However, current frameworks for software development best practices are not 
domain specific and don‘t address practices which are specific to the development of 
medical device software. Therefore, there is a need for a medical device software de-
velopment specific framework, which aims to combine industry best practices for the 
entire development and maintenance lifecycles of medical device software with neces-
sary regulations which medical device manufacturers must adhere to.  
Section 2, provides a description of the different types of software used within the 
healthcare domain. Section 3, provides details of the regulations to which  medical de-
vice manufacturers must adhere when developing medical device software. Section 4, 
details how medical device software organizations can develop safer and more reliable 
software by following Capability Maturity Models and discusses the development of a 
medical device software specific Process Assessment Model (PAM) and Process Ref-
erence Model (PRM) This PAM and PRM combine regulations with software devel-
opment industry best practices that medical device software organizations can follow 
when developing regulatory compliant software. Section 5, focuses on the develop-
ment of a PRM and PAM to manage the risks associated with the incorporation of a 
medical device into a hospital IT network. Section 6, discusses the development of a 
Security Assurance PRM and PAM which aims to assess the development process of a 
medical device and also establish a security capability level for the developed product 
and finally section 7 presents the summary and conclusions of this chapter.  
The primary contribution of this chapter is to provide medical device organizations 
with information relating to the regulations to which they must adhere and the stand-
ards they are recommended to follow. These standards and regulations cover areas in-
cluding medical device software development, the application of risk management to 
devices connected to a healthcare network and security use cases for medical devices. 
Also information regarding the frameworks which combines the requirements of regu-
lations, the guidance of the standards and industry best practices is presented. 
2. Types of Software used in Healthcare 
Software was first used in healthcare in the 1960‘s to perform administrative tasks. It 
was soon realized that introducing software into healthcare could decrease costs, in-
crease patient satisfaction and improve hospital processes which improves patient 
care. However, since its introduction the use of software has grown exponentially [2]. 
Whilst the first software used in healthcare was limited to administrative tasks, mod-
ern software can be used to perform various tasks ranging from registering patient de-
tails on admission into a hospital to controlling a life sustaining device such as defib-
rillators. As the range of tasks which software could perform was so vast, 
categorization of that software was required. This categorization is based upon the in-
tended use of the software and in accordance with regulatory requirements. These cat-
egories are: 
 Software as an accessory to a medical device; 
 Software as a medical device in its own right; 
 Software as a medical device data system (MDDS); or 
 Software currently unclassified and not subject to specific regulations. 
2.1 Software as an Accessory to a Medical Device 
 
An accessory to a medical device is an item which in itself is not a medical device but 
when connected to a medical device assists the medical device to perform its intended 
function; 
The EU regulations define an accessory to a medical device as [10]: 
“an article which whilst not being a device is intended specifically by its manufacturer 
to be used together with a device to enable it to be used in accordance with the use of 
the device intended by the manufacturer of the device” 
Crumpler and Rudolph provided two definitions of software as an accessory to a med-
ical device based upon the FDA‘s written guidance [11]:  
(1) “a (software) accessory is a (software) unit which is intended to be attached 
to or used in conjunction with another finished device”: or 
(2) “a software accessory to a medical device either accepts data from the user 
and modifies it for input to a medical device, or takes the data from a medical 
device modifies it for presentation to the user”. 
It can be seen that whilst the wording between the EU and FDA regulations varies, the 
definitions are very similar. In essence software is defined as being an accessory to a 
medical device when it is connected to a medical device to facilitate the operation of 
that medical device. For example, if a spreadsheet application receives input from a 
heart rate monitor and calculates averages heart rate over a period of time it is consid-
ered an accessory to a medical device. 
  
The key point to note is; where software meets the criteria of an accessory, it assumes 
the safety classification of the parent device to which it is connected. In our previous 
example, if the heart rate monitor received a Class III safety classification then the 
spreadsheet application would automatically assume the Class III safety classification 
and would undergo the same level of regulatory scrutiny as the heart rate monitor. 
2.2 Software as a medical device in its own right 
 
Software is defined as being a medical device if its intended function meets the defini-
tion of a medical device. In the EU the definition of medical device is [12]: 
“any instrument, apparatus, appliance, software, material or other article, whether 
used alone or in combination, including the software intended by its manufacturer to 
be used specifically for diagnostic and/or therapeutic purposes and necessary for its 
proper application” 
The FDA defines a medical device as: 
"...an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro rea-
gent, or other similar or related article, including a component part, or accessory 
which is: recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharma-
copoeia, or any supplement to them, intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or 
other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man 
or other animals, or intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man 
or other animals, and which does not achieve any of its primary intended purposes 
through chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is 
not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of any of its primary in-
tended purposes." 
Health Canada provides a specific definition as to when software is considered a med-
ical device [13]: 
“Software regulated as a medical device; 
(1) Provides the only means and opportunity to capture or acquire the data 
from a medical device for aiding directly in diagnosis or treatment of a 
patient; or 
(2) Replaces a diagnostic or treatment decision made by a physician.” 
2.3 Software as a Medical Device Data System 
 
In 2011, the FDA released its rule regarding MDDS known as CFR 21 Part 880.6310 
[14]. As part of this rule the FDA released its definition of a MDDS: 
“A device that is intended to provide one or more of the following uses, without con-
trolling or altering the functions or parameters of any connected medical devices: 
(i) The electronic transfer of medical device data; 
(ii) The electronic storage of medical device data; 
(iii) The electronic conversion of medical device data from one format to an-
other format in accordance with a pre-set specification; or 
(iv)The electronic display of medical device data.” 
Prior to this rule being introduced by the FDA, software performing any of the func-
tions outlined in the definition of a MDDS was either regarded as an accessory to a 
medical device which assumed the safety classification of the parent device or was 
considered a medical device in its own right and was required to undergo a separate 
process of achieving regulatory approval. However, since the introduction of this rule, 
if software exclusively performs one or more of the functions as outlined in the defini-
tion of a MDDS will automatically receive a Class I safety classification. The FDA 
has determined that any risk posed by a MDDS would potentially come from inade-
quate software quality or incorrect functioning of the device. It is expected that poten-
tial issues such as these would be resolved by the use of a QMS in accordance with 
FDA regulations [15]. 
There is, however, an exception to this rule. If software exclusively performs one or 
more of the functions outlined in the definition of a MDDS and is used for active pa-
tient monitoring then it cannot be considered a MDDS and must be considered an ac-
cessory or medical device.  
2.4 Software currently unclassified and not subject to specific regulation 
 
The previous sections have discussed software that is used directly and indirectly with 
patient care and the category into which they fall. However, there are software appli-
cations that are used in healthcare that are currently unclassified and not subject to 
specific regulation. 
Software used within Hospital Information Technology (HIT) which is only used for 
administrative purposes is currently unclassified [12]. Regulations are primarily con-
cerned with patient safety and as there is no potential risk to patient safety as result of 
a defect in administrative software, if falls beyond the scope of regulatory scrutiny. 
Also Electronic Health Records (EHR) and Computerized Physician Order Entry 
(CPOE) systems are currently unclassified. Upon reading the functions which these 
systems perform they do appear to fall into one of the categories previously men-
tioned. However, regulatory bodies have recognized that in the future these systems 
have the ability to automatically order tests for patients, therefore initiating the genera-
tion of clinical data and as a result would meet the definition of being a medical device 
[15]. 
3. Regulating Software in Healthcare 
As medical devices can have a direct impact on a person‘s wellbeing, necessary con-
trols are put in place to ensure the safe and reliable performance of the device. These 
controls take the form of regulations. Medical device manufacturers wishing to market 
a device into a region must adhere to the regulations of that region. In this section we 
describe the regulations within the EU, US and Canada which impact the development 
of software for use within the healthcare domain. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 European Union Regulations 
 
Medical devices marketed within the EU must carry the CE mark. The awarding of 
this mark certifies that the device has been developed in accordance with all of the ap-
plicable EU regulations. The CE mark is awarded by notified bodies within EU mem-
ber states and once a device manufacturer receives a CE mark in any member state 
they are permitted to market their device in all of the member states. 
Medical device manufactures must adhere to the Medical Device Directive (MDD) 
and its latest amendment to achieve the CE mark [16]. The MDD (93/42/EEC) has 
been amended 5 times with the latest amendment (2007/47/EC) being released in 
2007. As part of this amendment, there were 14 significant amendments to the original 
directive [17]. The most significant of these amendments to impact software is the in-
clusion of software into the definition of being a medical device. Whilst previous 
amendments did allow for software to be a component of  a medical device, they did 
not extend to standalone software being recognized as an active medical device. An 
active medical device is defined in the amendment to the MDD as: 
“any medical device operation of which depends on a source of electrical energy or 
any source of power other than that directly generated by the human body or gravity 
and which acts by converting this energy…..Stand-alone software is considered to be 
an active medical device” 
As a result of the inclusion of this wording into the amendment, situations may now 
arise where software can be the only component of a medical device used in a 
healthcare setting, subject to regulatory scrutiny. Prior to this amendment software was 
always seen as a component of a hardware device. To ensure the safety of the 
healthcare software  the latest amendment to the MDD states: 
“For devices which incorporate software or which are medical software in them-
selves, the software must be validated according to the state of the art taking into ac-
count the principles of development lifecycle, risk management, validation and verifi-
cation.” 
However, the amendment to the MDD does not clarify what is meant by ―state of the 
art‖, but it is generally accepted that state of the art is referred to as best practice and 
best practice for medical device software development is achieved by following IEC 
62304 and its aligned standards. To accompany this, the EU regulations require that all 
medical devices are developed in accordance with a Quality Management System 
(QMS), such as ISO 13485 and in accordance with a risk management standard such 
as ISO 14971. These standards are harmonized for use within the EU [18]. 
When the latest amendment to the MDD was released, confusion arose as to when 
software would be considered an active medical device. The only clarification provid-
ed as part of the amendment was that software used in healthcare for administrative 
purposes is considered not to be a medical device. It was not until January 2012 when 
the European Council released the MEDDEV [10] document to accompany the 
amendment to the MDD that clarified which type of software was subject to regulatory 
scrutiny.  
3.2 FDA Regulations 
 
Medical devices marketed in the US must meet the FDA requirements. Unlike the EU, 
the FDA is the only regulatory body with the authority to approve a medical device for 
use within the US. Also unlike the EU the FDA does not specifically regulate software 
used in healthcare. Rather, if the software meets the definition of being a medical de-
vice then it is regulated in the same way as a hardware device that meets the same def-
inition. All medical devices regardless of safety classification marketed in the US must 
adhere to either the FDA‘s Quality System Regulations (QSR) or to ISO 13485. How-
ever, since the Therac-25 incident, the FDA has recognized the increasingly signifi-
cant role which software plays in healthcare and as a result has commissioned guid-
ance documents which medical device software organizations can follow. These 
guidance documents include: 
 Design Controls Guidance for Medical Device Manufacturers [19]; 
 General Principles of Software Validation [20]; 
 Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration - Mobile Medical 
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Figure 3 FDA Regulations, Guidance Documents and Rule 
Applications [21]; 
 Guidance for Industry and FDA Reviewers and Compliance on Off-The-
Shelf Software use in Medical Devices [22]. 
Also in conjunction with the regulations and the guidance documents the FDA releases 
rules. The most recent of these rules which impact on the development of software is 
the rule on Medical Device Data Systems. Figure 1, shows the relationship between 
the regulations, guidance documents and rules. As with the EU, the FDA recognizes 
that IEC 62304 is considered to be medical device software development best practice 
and has been a consensus standard under FDA guidelines since September 2008. One 
advantage of following IEC 62304 is that medical device software development organ-
izations following IEC 62304 are not obliged to describe their processes in detail when 
seeking regulatory approval [23]. 
 
3.3 Health Canada Regulations 
 
Health Canada regulates medical devices through its Medical Device Regulations 
Document SOR/98-282 [24]. Health Canada requires medical device organizations to 
validate the performance of the software to ensure it performs as intended. Medical 
device software organizations are required to submit validation studies when seeking 
regulatory approval. As with the EU, Canada recognizes that software can be a medi-
cal device in its own right and as so necessary controls must be put in place to ensure 
the safe and reliable performance of that medical device software. To achieve this all 
medical devices marketed in Canada must be developed in accordance with ISO 
13485. Health Canada has also released guidance as to when software used in 
healthcare is considered to be a medical device.  
3.4 Safety Classifications 
 
Each region also categorizes medical devices based upon the potential risk the device 
poses. Table 1, shows the risk classification defined by each region and also shows 
how the risk classification of each region relates to the classification of the other re-
gions. 
The level of risk a device poses will determine the level of regulatory scrutiny applied 
to the device. For example, in the US class I devices are subject to the least amount of 
regulatory control. They are subject to ―General Controls‖ which includes provisions 
that concern issues such as misbranding and premarket notification. Class II devices 
are subject to ―General Controls‖ also, however they are subject special controls such 
as adherence to mandatory performance standards and post market surveillance. Post 
market surveillance is the practice in which the FDA monitors the device once it has 
been released onto the market. Finally, class III devices must adhere to ―General Con-
trols‖ and special controls as with Class II, however devices marketed as class III de-
vices must also request premarket approval. The process of achieving premarket ap-
proval involves the FDA evaluating the safety of the device prior to it being released 
onto the market [25]. 
 
Table 3. Safety Classification of Medical Devices 
Risk Low Medium High 
EU Class I Class IIa Class IIb Class III 
Canada Class I Class II Class III Class IV 
US Class I Class II Class III 
 
4. Developing Software for use in Healthcare 
The safety of medical device software is determined by the processes followed during 
development [26]. As a result medical device software manufacturers are advised to 
follow defined pathways when developing software. The Software Process Improve-
ment (SPI) is gaining momentum in the generic software development industry, but 
has yet to be widely adopted in the medical device software development industry 
[27]. SPI methods such as agile software development have shown significant benefits 
where they have been embraced.  
 
4.1 Capability Maturity Models in Medical Device Software 
 
SPI models exist including the  Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI
®
) [28] 
and  ISO 15504-5:2006 [29] (SPICE), but these do not provide sufficient coverage of 
medical device regulations and standards  [30].  In order to address the requirement for 
a medical device software process assessment and improvement model the Regulated 
Software Research Group (RSRG) at Dundalk Institute of Technology (DkIT) com-
menced the development of Medi SPICE a medical device specific SPI model which is 
being developed in collaboration with the SPICE User Group.  This model is being 
developed similarly to Automotive SPICE [31], which is a domain specific SPI model 
for the automotive industry. 
 
 
4.2 What is Medi SPICE? 
 
Medi SPICE is based upon the latest versions of ISO/IEC 15504-5  and  ISO/IEC 
12207:2008 [32].  It provides coverage of the relevant medical device regulations, 
standards, technical reports and guidance documents. These include IEC 62304:2006 
and its aligned standards, the FDA regulations [33]  and guidance documents, and the 
amendment to the European Medical Device Directive and guidelines. The objective 
of undertaking a Medi SPICE assessment is to determine the state of a medical device 
organization‘s software processes and practices in relation to the regulatory require-
ments of the industry  and to identify areas for process improvement [34]. It can also 
be used as part of the  supplier section process when an organization wishes to out-
source part or all of their medical device software development to a third party or a 
remote division [35].  
 
Medi SPICE contains a Process Reference Model (PRM) which consists of forty two 
processes and twelve subprocesses which are fundamental to the development of regu-
latory compliant medical device software.  Each process has a clearly defined purpose 
and outcomes that must be accomplished to achieve that purpose. Medi SPICE also 
contains a Process Assessment Model (PAM) which is related to the PRM and forms 
the basis for collecting evidence and the rating of process capability. This is achieved 
by the provision of a two-dimensional view of process capability. In one dimension, it 
describes a set of process specific practices that allow the achievement of the process 
outcomes and purpose defined in the PRM; this is termed the process dimension.  In 
the other dimension, the PAM describes capabilities that relate to the process capabil-
ity levels and process attributes, this is termed the capability dimension. 
 
In line with ISO/IEC 15504-2:2003 [36] Medi SPICE process capability is defined 
over 6 levels:  
 
 Level 0 Incomplete; 
 Level 1 Performed; 
 Level 2 Managed; 
 Level 3 Established; 
 Level 4 Predictable; 
 Level 5 Optimizing. 
 
The Medi SPICE PRM and PAM are being released in stages and each stage is exten-
sively reviewed by interested parties from the SPICE User Group, representatives 
from international medical device standards bodies (i.e. IEC SC62A JWG3) and in-
dustry experts.  This collaborative approach is seen as a key element in the develop-
ment of Medi SPICE to ensure coverage of both the SPI and medical device software 
regulatory requirements [34].  The overall objective of Medi SPICE is to provide a 
conformity assessment scheme to support first, second or third party assessments. It is 
envisaged that results from these assessments may be recognized by the relevant regu-
latory bodies.  
 
4.3 Assessing against Medi SPICE 
 
Like other SPI assessments models i.e. CMMI
®
 and IEC 15504-5:2006, a full Medi 
SPICE assessment will require considerable planning and resources to successfully 
undertake.  While Medi SPICE is being developed with the objective of being as effi-
cient as possible the necessity for rigor dictates the level of planning, resources and 
analysis required for its successful implementation. While the need for and importance 
of Medi SPICE is understood [37], it was also appreciated by the RSRG that there was 
a  specific  requirement for lightweight assessment methods in the medical device 
software industry [38].  In particular there was industry led demand for a lightweight 
assessment method based on Medi SPICE. This was communicated directly to the 
RSRG by numerous medical device organizations.  To address this specific require-
ment Medi SPICE-Adept was developed.  There were two additional objectives in un-
dertaking this task.  The first was the opportunity to leverage the extensive research 
[39] and level of detail which developing Medi SPICE provided. The second was the 
opportunity to identify and facilitate the use of agile and lean methods. The use of ag-
ile and lean methods for medical device software development is an area that the 
RSRG are also currently researching to assist organizations increase the efficiency of 
their software development practices [40]. 
 
To be effective Medi SPICE-Adept required the employment of a lightweight ap-
proach for undertaking software process assessment and improvement. This included 
the use of a limited number of personnel to carryout and participate in the assessment 
while also maximizing the benefit of the time and effort of those involved. It was en-
visaged that Medi SPICE-Adept would eventually encompass all the Medi SPICE pro-
cesses. It was therefore recognized that an assessment could take place either over 1 
day or a number of days depending on how many processes were being assessed. It 
was also important that organizations could select the specific processes which were of 
most benefit for achieving their business goals.  The focus of the method was on the 
evaluation of the essential practices, key work products and the achievement of the 
outcomes which were necessary for the attainment of the specific process purpose be-
ing assessed.  Medi SPICE-Adept therefore needed to be process dimension centric in 
its focus.   
 
Finally, the objective of undertaking a Medi SPICE-Adept assessment is not to receive 
formal certification or a rating, but rather to identify an organization‘s strengths and 
weaknesses and to facilitate process improvement. Having defined the criteria which 
had to be met the next step was to undertake the development of Medi SPICE-Adept.  
 
4.4 Assessing against Medi SPICE using lightweight assessment models  
 
The RSRG have previously developed and implemented three lightweight software 
process assessment methods Adept [41], Med-Adept [42] and Med-Trace [43]  the ob-
jective was to leverage that experience and utilize it for the development of Medi 
SPICE-Adept.  It was in this context that work commenced on the development of 
Medi SPICE-Adept.  It was recognized that this assessment method needed to cover 
more processes and provide more detailed analysis than those methods which had been 
previously developed.   While this was the case Medi SPICE-Adept was still required 
to be lightweight to fulfill its purpose.  The first task was to identify the initial Medi 
SPICE processes that would be utilized. The goal was to select a limited number of 
processes that would be most beneficial and relevant to industry.  To achieve this, in-
dustry experts were consulted and ten processes were selected: 
 
 Requirements Elicitation; 
 System Architectural design; 
 Systems Requirements Analysis;  
 Software Requirements Analysis,  
 Software Construction;  
 Software Integration;  
 Software Testing; 
 Configuration Management; 
 Change Request Management;  
 Verification. 
 
While these were the initial processes selected Medi SPICE-Adept will additionally 
provide coverage of all the Medi SPICE processes and subprocesses.   
 
The Medi SPICE PAM had been developed for each of the initial processes which 
were based on best practice as outlined by the latest version of ISO/IEC 15504-5 and 
the specific requirements of the medical device regulations, standards, technical re-
ports and guidance documents. As a result each process had a defined purpose and 
outcomes, specific practices and work products were also included for the achieve-
ment of these outcomes and purpose.  Additionally, each outcome and specific prac-
tice was mapped to the regulations, standards etc. on which it was based. To facilitate 
the assessment each of the initial processes were evaluated and specific questions 
identified based on the Medi SPICE PAM.  Questions relating to the current or poten-
tial use of agile and lean software methods were also identified and included. This 
work was undertaken by five members of the RSRG team with extensive experience 
of SPI and knowledge of medical device software development and included two ex-
perts in the area of lean and agile methods. The next step was to develop the specific 
procedure for implementing a Medi SPICE assessment. 
 
4.5 Implementing a Medi SPICE Assessment 
 
Based on the RSRG‘s previous experience of developing and undertaking lightweight 
software process assessments [38] a seven stage procedure for undertaking a Medi 
SPICE Assessment was defined. The assessment team should normally consist of two 
assessors who share responsibility for conducting the assessment. The seven stages of 
the procedure are as follows:   Prior to undertaking an assessment a preliminary meet-
ing between the lead assessor and the company takes place. This is the first stage in 
the procedure and during this meeting the lead assessor discusses the main drivers for 
the company wishing to undertake an assessment.  In this context the expectations re-
garding what can be realistically achieved are discussed and the procedure for under-
taking the assessment is outlined. Then a schedule is developed.  At the second stage 
the lead assessor meets with the staff and management from the company who will be 
participating in the assessment. Here an overview of the Medi SPICE assessment 
method is presented and details of what staff participation will involve. The onsite as-
sessment is the third stage in the procedure. During the onsite assessment the lead as-
sessor conducts interviews with relevant staff based on scripted Medi SPICE-Adept 
questions. The second assessor who also participates in the interviews prepares inter-
view notes and may ask additional questions when clarification is required.  Work 
products may also be requested and briefly reviewed at this stage. A maximum of five 
processes are assessed in a single day with the interviews for each process taking ap-
proximately one hour. At the fourth stage the findings report is prepared off-site based 
on the data gathered at stage three.  Each process is reviewed in turn and where rele-
vant particular strengths and issues (weaknesses) are identified based on the evaluation 
and interview notes.  Suggested actions to address these issues are then outlined and 
discussed.  The possibility for the use of appropriate agile and lean practices is also 
considered. These are then documented and included in the findings report.  This is a 
joint effort between the assessors and may include other SPI and/or lean and agile ex-
perts if required. The findings report is then presented to the management and staff 
who took part in the assessment which is the fifth stage in the procedure.  Having pro-
vided adequate time for the findings report to be read and considered by the organiza-
tion at the sixth stage the contents of the report is discussed in detail with the relevant 
management and staff.  At this point specific objectives for process improvement are 
collaboratively defined based on the findings report which results in the development 
of a process improvement plan.  Given the lightweight nature of Medi SPICE-Adept 
improvements that offer the greatest benefits in terms of compliance, quality and the 
achievement of business goals are selected for inclusion in this plan.  At the seventh 
stage in the procedure the organization having implemented the process improvement 
plan have the opportunity of having the processes reassessed. Based on this, a final de-
tailed report is prepared which highlights what has been achieved and an updated im-
provement plan is also provided. 
5. Risk Management of IT Networks Incorporating Medical Devices 
Traditionally, when medical devices were connected to a network, the network would 
be a proprietary network that would be provided, installed and supported by the medi-
cal device vendor. This allowed the medical device vendor to have control over con-
figuration such as IP addressing which made support and service of the network easier. 
With the medical device vendor providing the network, this relieved the hospital of the 
responsibility of supporting life critical applications themselves. However use of pro-
prietary networks in this way presented a number of disadvantages in that, as medical 
devices increasingly were designed to be incorporated into a network, the result was a 
proliferation of these networks resulting in the situation where large hospitals could 
have a large number of private networks. The maintenance of a large number of pri-
vate networks is impractical and increasingly devices are being designed to be incor-
porated into a hospitals general IT network. General hospital IT networks are highly 
flexible and highly configurable. Incorporating a medical device into a general IT 
network can introduce additional risks that are particular to the incorporation of the 
device into the IT network and which may not have been considered during the design 
and manufacture of the device [44]. 
In order to address these risks, IEC 80001-1: Application of risk management for IT-
networks incorporating medical devices [45] was published in 2010 which outlines the 
roles, responsibilities and activities that are required for the risk management of a 
medical IT network. IEC 80001-1 advocates a life cycle approach to risk management. 
The standard looks at the medical IT network from the perspective of maintaining 3 
key properties of the network – Safety, Effectiveness and (Data & System) Security. 
Safety deals with ensuring that the device does not cause harm to the patient, the user 
of the device or the environment. Effectiveness is concerned with ensuring that the de-
vice continues to provide the intended result for the patient and the Responsible Or-
ganization. A Responsible Organisation is defined within the standard as an entity ac-
countable for the use and maintenance of a medical IT network. Data & System 
Security ensures that information assets are reasonably protected from degradation of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. A medical IT network is defined within IEC 
80001-1 as an ―an IT network that incorporates at least one medical device‖.  
 
 
 
5.1 Assessment against IEC 80001-1 
 
While IEC 80001-1 outlines the roles, responsibilities and activities that are required 
for risk management, there is currently no method which allows for assessment against 
IEC 80001-1. In order to address this, a Process Assessment Model (PAM) has been 
developed to allow for assessment against IEC 80001-1. The PAM was developed in 
accordance with the requirements for Process Assessment as described in ISO/IEC 
15504-2 [46]. According to these requirements a PAM must be developed by extend-
ing a Process Reference Model (PRM) with the addition of a measurement framework. 
This measurement framework is described in ISO/IEC 15504-2 and contains 6 capa-
bility levels ranging from ―incomplete‖ to ―optimized‖. 
Once the requirements for the development of PRMs and PAMs as described in 
ISO/IEC 15504-2 had been reviewed, it was necessary to determine an approach to the 
development of the PRM and PAM for assessment against IEC 80001-1. In order to do 
determine this approach, a review of standards similar to IEC 80001-1 was undertaken 
in order to determine what assessment methods were available for assessment against 
these standards and to determine how these assessment methods were developed. The 
research focused on ISO/IEC 20000-1 [47] which is a generic Service Management 
standard which is identified in Annex D of IEC 80001-1 as being similar to IEC 
80001-1. While a medical IT network is set up to fulfill a specific purpose, it shares a 
number of characteristics with a general IT network [48]. Recognising this, in Annex 
D of IEC 80001-1 the requirements of ISO/IEC 20000 were reviewed to see if they 
could fulfill the requirements of IEC 80001-1. While it was recognized that IEC 
20000-1 could not fulfill all of the requirements of IEC 80001-1, Annex D highlights 
areas where there are common processes between the two standards and areas where 
though the terminology is different, the underlying role, document or process is simi-
lar. The research focused on the Tudor IT Service Management Process Assessment 
(TIPA)[49]  method which can be used to assess against ISO/IEC 20000-1 and another 
Service Managements standard, the Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
(ITIL) [50].   
During the development of the TIPA assessment method it was noted that while 
ISO/IEC 15504-2 is clear in its requirements for process assessment in terms of the 
development of PRMs and PAMs, it does not provide guidance on how to transform 
the input or the domain requirements into the output or the PRM and PAM [51]. To 
address this need the TIPA transformation process, a goal oriented requirements engi-
neering technique, was developed to give guidance ion the development of PRMs and 
PAMs which are consistent with the requirements as expressed in ISO/IEC 15504-2. 
The TIPA transformation technique also ensures that the processes within the PRM 
and PAM are described in a way which is consistent with ISO/IEC TR 24774 [52] 
which gives guidelines for process description.  Given the similarities between 
ISO/IEC 20000-1 and IEC 80001-1 as previously discussed, the TIPA transformation 
process was used in the development of the PRM and PAM for assessment against 
IEC 80001-1. The transformation process was used in the development of the PRM 
which was then extended with the addition of a measurement framework to form the 
PAM. The PRM & PAM for assessment against IEC 80001-1 is discussed in the next 
section. 
 
5.2 IEC 80001-1 Process Reference Model & Process Assessment Model 
 
The PRM for assessment against IEC 80001-1 contains 2 main process categories – 
Primary Processes and Organizational Processes. The Primary Processes category is 
concerned with the performance of risk management activities and contains 3 process 
groups which contain 9 processes in total. The process groups in the Primary Process-
es category are Medical IT Network Risk Management Process Group, Change Re-
lease Management & Configuration Management Process Group and finally the Live 
Network Risk Management Process Group. The Organizational Process category is 
concerned with the planning and management or risk management activities and con-
tains a single process group called the Medical IT Network Documentation and Plan-
ning Process Group which contains 5 Processes. The PRM maintains the ―Plan, Do, 
Check, Act‖ approach which is used in ISO/IEC TR 20000-4[53] (which is the PRM 
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Figure 5 – IEC 80001-1 PRM Process Map 
 
for ISO/IEC 20000-1). The 14 processes as defined in the PRM are shown below. 
The descriptions of the processes shown in Figure 5 were extended to include base 
practices and work products which together with the addition of the measurement 
framework formed the PAM.  
 
5.3 Future Validation and Development of the Assessment Framework 
 
The next stage once complete will allow for assessment against IEC 80001-1 using an 
assessment method. The assessment method will be follow a staged process which will 
deal with aspects of the management of the assessment and which will provide a com-
prehensive list of questions related to each process within the PAM which will allow 
the assessor to establish the capability level associated with each process which will be 
the main stage of the assessment method. On the basis of this stage of the assessment, 
areas for improvement will be identified which will be communicated. A plan for the-
se improvements will be delivered and a further assessment against this plan will be 
completed at a later date. Work on the development of this assessment method is on-
going.  
The PRM and PAM which have been developed are currently being validated. Valida-
tion will be carried out in three ways. The PRM and PAM which are described in this 
chapter will be reviewed by the developers of the TIPA framework who will review 
the PRM and PAM in terms of their conformance with the requirements of ISO/IEC 
15504-2 using experience gained during the development of a ISO/IEC 15504-2 com-
pliant PAM for assessment against ISO/IEC 20000-1.The PAM has been raised as a 
new work item proposal for inclusion in the IEC 80001 family of standards. In the se-
cond stage of validation, the PAM will be reviewed by members of the international 
standards community, who have developed the IEC 80001-1 standard, in terms of its 
ability to assess against the requirements contained within IEC 80001-1. The final 
stage of validation will be the use of the PAM and assessment method within a hospi-
tal environment. The validated PAM and assessment method will then be used to per-
form a trial assessment within another hospital. The final PRM, PAM and assessment 
method will allow for assessment against IEC 80001-1. The PAM will be included in 
the IEC 80001 family of standards and as an international standard will provide an in-
ternationally recognized way to assess against the requirements as outlined in the IEC 
80001-1 standard.  
6. Security Assurance of Medical Devices 
In the last number of years, there has been substantial advancement in the design and 
functionality of medical devices to offer patients a more sophisticated, reliable means 
of medical care. These advancements are mainly due to the growing use of software in 
medical devices. With the inclusion of software in medical devices, the next step in 
advancement came with the introduction of interoperable and connected medical de-
vices incorporating technology to communicate wirelessly and across networks. The 
advantage of this development in medical device design is that patients can now re-
ceive around the clock monitoring and real-time treatment outside the healthcare envi-
ronment without a consultant present. As for the healthcare providers, these devices al-
leviate the need for additional resources to monitor and administer the care or 
treatment to their patients. The downside to this is that while these design advance-
ments do benefit the healthcare industry and patient care in many ways, it also intro-
duces new risks to patient safety. These are security risks, vulnerabilities and threats.  
Traditionally medical devices were designed to be stand-alone devices but we see 
many different types of devices that communicate wirelessly and over networks in to-
day‘s world with each device type presenting different security concerns. While there 
have been no malicious attacks on medical devices recorded to date there have been a 
number of controlled hacks on medical devices. Implantable medical devices (IMDs) 
have been targets of some of the controlled hacks in the last year or so. One such inci-
dent was at the Black Hat Security Conference in Las Vegas in 2011. The diabetic se-
curity researcher carried out a controlled hack on his own insulin pump during his 
presentation and gained sufficient access to allow him to increase and decrease the in-
sulin dosage. On both occasions, there was no warning that the device had been tam-
pered with and there was no warning that the patient could possibly die. External med-
ical devices also pose problems with regard security. Many devices have built in 
Figure 6 - Approach Overview 
commercial operating systems, which were designed by software developers but, be-
cause these are widely used operating systems, they are more susceptible to malicious 
attacks.  The other types of medical devices which are of concern are the increasingly 
portable medical devices and Bring Your Own Devices (BYODs). More and more 
practitioners are using smartphones and iPads to retrieve electronic patient health in-
formation (EPHI) in patient consultations [54].  
The age of interoperability and connected medical devices has just begun and so the 
area of security in such devices is not fully exploited as yet by the medical device 
community and researchers but more worryingly by malicious attackers. As of yet, 
there is no formal governance for the assessment of such medical devices process ca-
pability or for the establishment of medical device product capability with regard secu-
rity. Over the last number of years there has been a lot of concern among the medical 
device community in regard to interoperable and connected medical devices and their 
communication abilities in terms of security vulnerabilities, threats and risks. This has 
been reflected through the many publications, technical reports and guidance docu-
ments released such as IEC/TR 80001-2-2 [55]. In August 2012, the Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO) published a report [56] that clearly indicated the need for 
the FDA to enhance their assessment of security medical devices and concluded with 
the recommendation that the FDA address these issues. 
This section discusses research that sets out to address this problem by establishing a 
methodology to assure the security of connected and interoperable medical devices on 
IT networks. Figure 6 outlines the architecture of the solution that is discussed in more 
detail in the following sections. 
 
6.1 Establishing Meaningful Security Controls 
 
The first step in developing this model is to conduct a comprehensive review of exist-
ing security standards and guidance documents. These will include ISO/IEC 27001 
[57], ISO/IEC 27799 [58], ISO 15408 [59], IEC 62443-3-3 [60], and NIST SP 800-53 
[61].  Each of these standards and guidance documents similarly present security clas-
ses and controls. A list of applicable security controls to be addressed during the de-
velopment risk assessment process will be derived from the previously mentioned 
sources through the use of expert opinion. The FDA and carefully selected expert us-
ers will validate this derived set of controls. The outcome of this will be a published 
technical report with a cross-standard mapping of security controls to be considered in 
regard to interoperable medical devices communicating over an IT network. 
IEC/TR 80001-2-2 [55] is a technical report that sets out to promote the communica-
tion of security controls, needs and risks of medical devices to be incorporated into IT 
networks between Medical Device Manufacturers (MDMs), IT vendors and 
Healthcare Delivery Organisations (HDOs).  This technical report presents 20 security 
capabilities (See Table 6.1). It is anticipated that the upcoming technical report outlin-
ing a set of mandatory security controls will be reflected in a new revision of IEC 
80001-2-2 should the technical report highlight gaps with the existing 20 security ca-
pabilities. 
 
6.2 Process Assurance 
 
This research presents a methodology to address security concerns in the medical de-
vice domain specifically looking at networked medical devices. As a way to assure 
medical devices, the methodology takes an approach from the development process 
capability and also the final product quality assurance. In establishing a process capa-
bility level for the development of a medical device, MDMs gain better control over 
their processes and output. This also proves beneficial from a compliance assessment 
point of view when there are clearly defined and measurable processes in place.  
Table 6.1 - IEC/TR 80001-2-2 Capabilities 
 
 
Security Capability Code 
1 Automatic Logoff ALOF 
2 Audit Controls AUDT 
3 Authorization AUTH 
4 Configuration of Security Features CNFS 
5 Cyber Security Product Upgrades CSUP 
6 Data Backup and Disaster Recovery DTBK 
7 Emergency Access EMRG 
8 Health Data De-Identification DIDT 
9 Health Data Integrity and Authentication IGAU 
10 Health Data Storage Confidentiality STCF 
11 Malware Detection/Protection MLDP 
12 Node Authentication NAUT 
13 Person Authentication PAUT 
14 Physical Locks on Device PLOK 
15 Security Guides SGUD 
16 System and Application Hardening SAHD 
17 Third-Party Components in Product Lifecycle Roadmaps RDMP 
18 Transmission Confidentiality TXCF 
19 Transmission Integrity TXIG 
20 Unique User ID UUID 
 
For the problem solution a PAM will be used. These are widely used in software /I.T. 
businesses to measure the capability of an organization to achieve particular processes. 
The two most widely used models are CMMI [62] and the ISO/IEC 15504 family .  
We have selected the international standard for process assessment, ISO/IEC 15504-2 
[63] that sets out requirements for defining process assessment models and for per-
forming process assessments. 
In using this standard, the two major outcomes will be a PRM and PAM.  A PAM con-
tains two dimensions; these are the Process Dimension and the Capability Dimension. 
The Process Dimension is developed from an external PRM that provides the process-
es for assessment in terms of ‗Purpose‘ and ‗Outcome‘. The PAM expands the PRM 
with the use of Performance Indicators called Base Practices and Work Products.  
Work Products are both the inputs and outputs to each process and the Base Practices 
describe the process activities that convert these inputs to process outputs. 
The Capability Dimension is based upon six capability levels ranging from Level 0 
‗Incomplete‘ to Level 5 ‗Optimizing‘.  Achievement of a capability level is based up-
on the achievement of Process Attributes (of which there are a total of nine) for Capa-
bility Levels 1 through to 5. A Process Attribute is the measurement characteristic of 
each process.  For example, in achieving capability level 1, ‗Performed‘, the Process 
Attribute is Process Performance, for capability level 2, ‗Managed‘, one Process At-
tribute is Process Management, and so on. 
ISO/IEC 15504-6 [64] describes an exemplar PAM and will form the foundation of 
the model as it utilizes ISO/IEC 15288 [65] as the PRM. This international standard 
(ISO/IEC 15288) has been selected as it addresses system life cycle processes. As the-
se networked medical devices can contain a combination of hardware, software, peo-
ple, processes etc. it is deemed the most suitable foundation for the PAM.  ISO/IEC 
15288 is a framework to improve the communication and cooperation among parties 
that design, develop, use and maintain systems. It covers the entire life cycle of sys-
tems development from concept straight through to retirement and also including ac-
quisition and supply processes. 
Due to the criticality of networked medical devices, this PAM will be extended to in-
clude additional processes from ISO/IEC 15026-4 [66]. This is yet another interna-
tional standard specifically addressing assurance in the life cycle.  ISO/IEC 15026-4 is 
mainly utilized where additional assurance for a critical property, such as dependabil-
ity, safety or security, is required for a system or software.  The standard is used as an 
add-on to an already existing life cycle process standard such as that of ISO/IEC 
15288. Therefore, this extension of the PAM lines up with ISO/IEC 15504-6 building 
upon existing processes addressed here.  
Finally, the PAM will be further extended to include the 20 security capabilities pre-
sented in IEC/TR 80001-2-2 (Table 6.1). This will be included in the system risk man-
agement process. In developing a networked medical device, MDMs will be required 
to specifically address all 20 security capabilities and determine which of those are 
applicable to the medical device. Justification of non-applicable security capabilities 
will be required. 
 
6.3 Product Assurance 
 
Having established the process assurance for the development of medical devices to be 
incorporated into an IT network, the research will further assure the medical device by 
addressing the security assurance of the deliverable. This means assurance starts at the 
beginning of the acquisition process between the HDO and the MDM. In support of 
IEC/TR 80001-2-2, the outcome of this methodology will be the communication of the 
target security capability requirement of a device by the HDO to the MDM and then a 
justification of an achieved security capability requirement from the MDM to the 
HDO. This is the first input in the product assurance strategy of this model. In com-
municating this information a vector schema will be utilised.  Table 6.1 presents the 
security capabilities. In order to better define the requirements of the HDO this will be 
further broken down. Each security capability will have a sub set of requirements. Ta-
ble 6.2 shows an example break down for security capability Automatic Logoff 
(ALOF). Each of the security capability requirements will be displayed on a vector as 
follows: 
T-ALOF = {1, 0, 1, 1, 0} 
This vector indicates the HDO‘s target security capability requirement (T) for Auto-
matic Logoff to have in place the sub requirements ALOF.01, ALOF.03 and ALOF.04.  
Zero on the vector indicates that that particular sub requirement is not required. This 
format will be used for all security capabilities and their sub requirements. During the 
risk management process, required security controls will be identified.  These controls 
will be the second input to the product assurance element of this methodology. This 
will be achieved through the utilisation of a tool.  This tool will be used to further 
build on the risk management processes. Each security capability will be addressed in 
the FMEA or risk analysis builder within the tool. In turn the tool will automatically 
build an assurance case and outline in detail the evidence gathered to support the 
achievement of each security assurance level.  To date, assurance cases have mainly 
be used within in the medical device domain to address safety and are recommended 
to MDMs as part of the infusion pump initiative [67]. A similar type methodology will 
be adapted here addressing security as the critical property. 
ISO/IEC 15026-2 [68] defines requirements for the structure and content of an assur-
ance case. An assurance case is a body of evidence organized into an argument 
demonstrating some claim that a system holds i.e. is acceptably secure. An assurance 
case is needed when it is important to show that a system exhibits some complex 
property such as safety, security, or reliability. Security assurance cases are often 
compared with a legal case where there are two elements to the case, the argument and 
the evidence to support a claim. For an assurance case to be effective it must satisfy 
the following points: 
 Must make a claim or set of claims about a property of a system; 
 Produce the supportive evidence; 
 Provide a set of arguments; 
 Make clear the assumptions and judgements underlying the arguments; 
 Associate different viewpoints and level of detail. 
Upon completion of the risk management process, the MDM will have established the 
achieved security capability requirements for the product and developed a security as-
surance case with proof, through evidence, of the security assurance of the networked 
medical device. This will be detailed on the security assurance case, which will be 
held by the MDM for third party regulatory assessment. It may be the communication 
article between the MDM and the HDO in which, the HDO IT Administration staff 
may include in their risk management file should the medical device be installed into 
their IT network. Upon completion of the security assurance case, the MDM will then 
follow the same format as the HDOs to highlight the security capability requirements 
as was done at the start of the acquisition process by the HDO. They too will use a 
vector format to present the achieved security capability requirements of the medical 
device.  Using the previous example, the achieved security capability requirements (A) 
Implementation 
Identifier 
Capability 
ALOF.01 A screensaver starts automatically 5 minutes after last key-
stroke/mouse movement operation 
ALOF.02 The screensaver clears all displayed health data from the 
screen. 
ALOF.03 The screensaver does not log-off the user / does not terminate 
the session. 
ALOF.04 User has to log-in after occurrence of the screensaver 
ALOF.05 The user-session terminates automatically 60 minutes after 
last keystroke/mouse movement/touchscreen operation. 
 
Table 6.2 - Security Capability Requirements for ALOF 
for Automatic Logoff could be as shown below. This example shows that ALOF.02, 
although not stated as a target security capability requirement, is also shown as being 
implemented.  Again, for each of the 20 security capabilities, the achieved security ca-
pability requirements will be communicated to the HDO. 
A-ALOF = {1, 1, 1, 1, 0} 
7. Conclusions and Summary 
Medical devices have a direct impact on an individual‘s wellbeing. Therefore to en-
sure the safe and reliable performance of medical devices regulations have been put in 
place. These regulations dictate what information a medical device manufacturer 
should produce as evidence as to how safe the device is. However, regulatory bodies 
do not provide comprehensive guidance as to how this objective evidence must be 
produced.  
  
Traditionally, a medical device was considered a hardware device with a software 
component. In this case, the safety of the device could be proved through the hardware 
functioning of the device. However, recent changes to regulations now mean that a 
medical device may consist solely of software. As a result there is no hardware ele-
ment which can produce evidence to support the safety of the device. To overcome 
this, medical device software organizations are recommended to follow the latest state 
of the art development processes and standards such as IEC 62304; however, IEC 
62304 has not been updated since the recent changes to regulations and as a result it is 
not sufficiently comprehensive to provide coverage of all of the necessary stages of 
development. 
 
To fill this void and to draw upon the software industry best practices, Medi SPICE is 
currently under development by the RSRG. Medi SPICE will act as a single point of 
reference for medical device software organizations when developing regulatory com-
pliant software. Medi SPICE combines international regulations, medical device soft-
ware standards and software development best practices to a single point. Medi SPICE 
aims to provide coverage of all of the stages of medical device software development 
and maintenance. 
 
While Medi SPICE is under development to respond to the needs of the medical de-
vice software industry an emerging area causing concerns regarding medical device 
safety, is the connecting of medical device to networks. This creates a new level of 
concern with regards to the impact other devices on the same network will have on the 
medical device and also the potential security implications of a device being accessed 
by an unauthorized user. To address these risks two frameworks are currently under 
development by the RSRG which aim to address these risks.  
     
IEC 80001-1 takes a life cycle approach to risk management of IT networks which in-
corporate medical devices. The incorporation of a device into an IT network can intro-
duce risks that may not have been considered during the design and manufacture of the 
medical device. While HDOs may perform risk management activities, there is no 
method that exists to allow a HDO to assess the capability of their risk management 
processes against the requirements of IEC 80001-1 which outlines risk management 
activities which are specific to the incorporation of a medical device into an IT net-
work. Research to date has focused on the development of a PRM and PAM for as-
sessment against IEC 80001-1. The PRM and PAM have been raised as a new work 
item proposal and will be part of a technical report within the IEC 80001-1 family of 
standards. When an assessment is performed using the IEC 80001-1 PAM, this will al-
low the HDO to assess the capability of risk management processes and will provide 
an insight into areas where process improvement can take place and a higher capabil-
ity level can be achieved. IEC/TR 80001-2-2 defines the security capabilities that a 
MDM or IT vendor must communicate to the HDO in order to enhance knowledge of 
security risks and controls the HDO IT administration staff should consider and vice 
versa. The outcome of this research will provide many benefits for both the HDOs and 
the MDMs.  For the HDOs some of the benefits will include: 
1. A common framework to assist in the selection of suppliers through process 
capability levels. 
2. Guidance for the communication of medical device security needs. 
3. Better understanding of the security capability of the devices. 
4. Knowledge of the security assurance of the device through the use of a vector 
for the target and achieved security capability requirements.  
The MDMs also benefit through: 
1. Better knowledge of the capability level of their life cycle processes with 
clear insight for process improvement. 
2. A method to add additional assurance to their processes through the extension 
of the PRM using the international standard ISO/IEC 15026-4, Assurance in 
the Life Cycle. 
3. A focused security risk management process with the inclusion of a defined 
set of security capabilities and further requirements. 
4. A method and tool for the automatic development of security assurance cases 
Currently, there is no methodology to address both the development processes and the 
product capabilities of medical devices in terms of security. Hence, it is envisaged that 
the output of our  research will positively impact the medical device domain in both 
the EU and the US by building awareness of security vulnerabilities, threats and relat-
ed risks between the HDO and the MDM [69].  
Whilst the research presented in this chapter is on-going, there is a clear need for the 
models which have been presented. This need has been identified through collabora-
tion with the medical device industry, the standards community and regulatory bodies 
such as the FDA. Once completed, each of the models presented will have a direct im-
pact on the safe and reliable performance of medical devices which are also secure.  
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